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Abstract
Increasingly large amounts of personal information are being captured and stored within healthcare
systems; and these data are being shared increasingly widely, and aggregated into ever larger data
warehouses. There are good and proper reasons for doing this and the end result will bring benefits to
physicians, patients and the community. However there are also demands for health information, for
unethical and illegal purposes, and the evidence indicates that there is a ready supply line for it; on the
other hand there may be little need to use that supply line when such vast quantities of personalised
health information are regularly being lost or otherwise disclosed by government and private sector
organisations.
This article takes a careful look at information privacy to determine where and how personal information
is being abused and disclosed, and how to prevent this. Some of the disclosures are simply a
consequence of laziness and carelessness; others are calculating and deliberate; but they can all be
controlled and in some cases eliminated by applying well-established methods and technology. The
problem seems to be that institutions either do not understand what is required of them, or do not care
enough to implement the appropriate measures. It seems also that systems are not being planned with
privacy in mind, and consequently are not readily able to accommodate these demands.
Keywords: Health Information Privacy; Unique Identifiers; Network Infrastructures
1 Introduction
Patients expect that the healthcare system will keep
their personal care records secret. Arguments have been
put forward that privacy of health information is only
an issue of concern for those with something to hide.5
Whether or not this is true, the evidence suggests the
issue is a priority for a large part of the population[1,2],
and patients are unwilling to tell the whole truth about
certain health matters where they feel their information
may not be kept private, so making the task of care10
providers more difficult and risky. This aligns with the
ethical principle of personal autonomy, which recog-
nises the right of the patient to control all matters relat-
ing to their own body, including information about it.
Medicine has a long history of ethics going back to the15
oath of Hippocrates[3], which includes the requirement
to keep secret information that is shared with a clinician
in a consultation. Many professional associations re-
quire their members to keep such confidences, and many
hold the power to censure or de-register their members20
whose ethical conduct fails to match up to expectations,
even if they have not actually committed a legal offence.
Public anxiety about information privacy is high, es-
pecially as a consequence of the almost daily losses of
personal information from both private and government25
records, the statistics of which are quite frightening[4]:
disclosed reports detail over 120 million records that
were affected in 2011, with almost one third of the in-
cidents occurring in the health sector; how much this
would be increased by inclusion of undisclosed losses is30
anyone’s guess. There is undoubtedly a strong demand
for personal information of all types, including health
information[eg 5], and the system of data protection is
potentially flawed[eg 6,7].
Issues relating to information privacy and system35
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security are crucial issues in the context of information
management systems: trust is hard won and loss of trust
can be extremely damaging[8] especially where such
sensitive information as that recorded for healthcare is
involved. Failure to manage these effectively can cause40
loss of confidence and bring major information systems
to their knees unless users (public and professionals
alike) are assured of the highest level of integrity and
privacy protection.
The legal system recognises the personal autonomy45
principle, and requires that the patient is given the right
to control what happens to their bodies and to their
personal information: every action and intervention re-
lating to these matters must be the subject of a valid and
informed legal consent process. Whilst consent may50
be implied and valid, the weakness is that this depends
totally on who is making that implication and whether
or not it aligns with the patients intentions. There are
two relevant bodies of law in UK: one is the Human
rights Act (1998), in which article 8 guarantees that the55
State shall not interfere with the privacy of individual;
the other is the Data Protection Act (1998) which places
numerous obligations on those who are custodians of
personal information in respect of all processes in the
information cycle (data collection, storage, access, use,60
disclosure, destruction etc). It is a specific obligation
that custodians of personal information keep personal
information secure and protected from any unauthorised
access. Equivalent legislation exists in most other devel-
oped countries, and it seems reasonable to suppose that65
a roughly equivalent arrangement should be the basis
of systems planning worldwide, not simply based on
ethics. Being a signatory to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948), Australia supports the issues,
although it lacks a Human Rights Act: however it does70
have a Privacy Act[9].
There are numerous legitimate uses for which health
information is required: authorisation to access it and
the terms and conditions of that access thus becomes
a vital issue. In terms of the ethical principle of per-75
sonal autonomy, the only legitimate day-to-day source
of authority to access records where the subject is identi-
fied is the patient[10,11], whether or not their physician
may believe that refusing permission to disclose person-
alised information (eg to a colleague) is wise. However80
confidentiality is not absolute: there are various excep-
tional circumstances recognised, such as where access
is permitted by statute, by court order, or where there
is a real belief that disclosure is necessary to prevent a
crime or the risk of serious damage or injury, or where85
there is an overriding issue of public interest. The law
recognises the personal autonomy principle as of cen-
tral and guiding importance in the form of data protec-
tion Acts and associated privacy principles[eg 12,13].
In the exceptional event that the patient appears inca-90
pable of giving valid consent to access their records (eg
through incapacity, confusion, lack of comprehension,
inability to reason etc), the attending clinician may take
whatever steps are believed necessary in the context
of solving the immediate health problem, including ac-95
cessing/disclosing information as well as undertaking
interventions, without patient authority under the legal
doctrine of the ‘best interests’ of the patient.
For clarity there follow (below) a number of working
definitions of concepts used in this article with which100
general readers may not be familiar:
• Private: the right of a person to control who knows
what about them, and to reveal themselves, and par-
ticularly that information which they consider sen-
sitive, selectively and at a time, place and manner105
of their choosing,
• Confidentiality: an ethical principle (and in some
instances, including medicine, a legal requirement)
to keep information divulged by one person to
another within a tightly restricted environment and110
to prevent it becoming public knowledge
• Security: keeping information available to autho-
rised users, ensuring it is neither lost or corrupted,
and protecting it from all forms of attack, and par-
ticularly access by unauthorised persons115
• Primary use: the primary use of healthcare infor-
mation is in the context of the care services pro-
vided to the patient, now and in the future, includ-
ing such associated but necessary administrative
functions as audit, quality assurance and account-120
ing
• Secondary use: the secondary uses of health infor-
mation include all those uses that are not directly
related to the care of the individual, including re-
search, public health studies, data warehousing,125
business management, manpower and facilities
planning, statistical returns etc
• Personalised information: care information which
is associated with personally identifying data
which is sufficient for a third party (eg analyst)130
to be able to identify the person concerned, the in-
formation is ‘personalised’: where re-identification
is impossible the information is ‘de-personalised’
or ‘de-identified’.
This article refers at various points to issues of ethics135
and the law. Medical ethics have no geographic limit to
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their application, but the law does recognise different
jurisdictions. In this article reference is generally made
to Australian and UK laws, but equivalent legislation
exists in almost every developed nation.140
2 Uses of Health Information
A century ago there was just one purpose for making and
keeping health records: that was to act as an aide mem-
oire to the physician (primary user) as to what was the
patient problem and how it was progressing, and to cal-145
culate the account for payment by the patient. Although
this primary function of medical records remains un-
changed, since that time the uses to which health infor-
mation from personal care records is put have expanded
considerably, including insurers and payors, administra-150
tors and business managers, finance officers, auditors,
referral services, nurses, clinic/ward clerks, technicians,
clinicians and so on.
Some of these parties (eg other clinicians and audi-
tors) may need access to the full details in the patient155
record, and this disclosure may require the authorisation
of the patient (see above). Most of the rest do not need
access to the full records of the care event, but their
needs can be served with abstracts – eg unique identity,
service date(s), diagnosis(es) or reasons for encounter,160
services provided (translates to billable event(s)), ser-
vice provider/clinic etc. These details are quite sufficient
to enable the event(s) to be administratively verified and
accounted for, and for an invoice to be raised and recon-
ciled with the payment when received from the payor:165
this also serves to preserve patient privacy. However the
current typical arrangement is that almost anyone in the
care enterprise has access to the full records of care for
all patients, irrespective of their needs: alternate views
in which only an abstract of the record appropriate to170
the specific data needs of that user are not generally
available. This almost universal practice demonstrates
either a scant regard for the law relating to personal
information privacy on the part of the users/institution,
or a failure to comprehend its provisions on the part175
of both systems developer/vendor and users/institution.
There is data from several other sources to supporting
the notion that healthcare professionals and institutions
are either ignorant or careless as regards privacy issues
– not least the catalogue of recorded and entirely avoid-180
able data losses[14], as well as specific studies showing
evidence that privacy practices amongst some of those
with custodianship of confidential electronic medical
records are less than adequate[15].
As an extension to enable records to better serve the185
primary purposes, there is considerable interest and
potential to benefit clinicians and patients alike through
bringing together all the events and encounters for an
individual into a longitudinal record of care, thereby
creating a single repository that could in principle chart190
the health-related events for an individual from ‘cradle
to grave’. Such a repository could be of considerable
benefit to the patient, but access to it would clearly need
to be under the control of the individual, who should
also have the ability to control who sees which parts of195
the whole.
Moving on to the secondary (ie not directly linked
to the care of the patient) uses of healthcare records,
these extend to the wider interests of public health and
research. There is a fast growing and potentially in-200
trusive demand for care information to bring records
together into data warehouses in order to analyse, search
and summarise them for new insights into incidences,
causation, natural history, treatments and outcomes.
These analyses will throw new light on trends, data205
linkages/associations, new syndromes, treatment risks
(eg associated with devices, medicines, procedures), di-
agnostic pathways, best quality care practices, costs,
quality of life etc which will be invaluable in informing
clinicians and patients of the options and statistics re-210
lating to their situation. These data can be formulated
into knowledgebases, which are becoming of consider-
able interest for development of artificially intelligent
clinical decision support systems, and to contain costs,
manage risks and get the best possible value for every215
health dollar spent. None of these purposes requires
the actual identity of the individual to be disclosed: the
data can be anonymised with all personal identifiers
removed. However anonymisation does impeded some
longitudinal studies where following the same patient220
over time is required, in which case the data may be
pseudonymised where personal identifiers are replaced
with a cipher, but the cipher remains always the same for
that individual so permitting longitudinal record linking.
3 The Privacy Challenge225
The issue with information management systems is that
they are designed to achieve specific purposes, and those
purposes are deeply embedded in the way the systems
are built and operate ‘behind the scenes’. So, for exam-
ple, if a records system is populated with information230
about a number of individuals, the simplest way for it to
function is to permit any authorised user to have access
to any and all records, thereby giving the user the max-
imum functionality and allowing them to do whatever
they may wish with the stored information. In many sys-235
tems the embedded functionality is all-important, since
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the data that is being collected is normally made avail-
able (for a fee) to commercial operators who use it to
generate business opportunities, thereby improving the
financial viability of the system and maximising the in-240
come from it. Examples abound of personal information
stored in databases being sold to third parties[eg 5,16]
without the knowledge of the individuals concerned:
the UKs information commissioner has commented that
‘the penalties aren’t strong enough to stop it’.245
The point at issue is that the personal information
privacy requirements of a system must be built in to
the system from the start: it is often impractical to
tack them on after the system is built. The preceding
sections outline the parameters which any ethical and250
legal health information management system must be
able to accommodate.
3.1 Confidential Data Disclosures
There is an understandable reluctance to admit to the
existence or extent of data losses and the reasons for255
them, given the potential for legal actions as well as loss
of public trust. However the health service appears to
be the sector with the largest reported confidential data
losses (about 1/3 of total reported incidents[17]), and
there is a chronological record of the incidents and how260
they were perpetrated[14] which provides information
as to the events that gave rise to these losses.
Based on the evidence[14] it would seem that the
most widely reported acts that lead to confidentiality
breaches are:265
• Losses
– through unintended disclosures – eg exposed
to the web, sent to the wrong recipient, inad-
equate access controls etc.
– through physical loss of paper, media, com-270
puters, memory devices, etc.
• Abuses:
– authorised users abusing their privileges,
making improper disclosures, carelessness
and fraud275
• Hackers and malware:
– Electronic access by an external (non-
authorised) party (‘hacker’), including
through the use of malware and spyware
However, as outlined above, there are other ways280
in which personalised data may be abused, some of
which go unrecognised and unreported since they are
widely seen as part of the ‘normal operation’ of an
institution, even though they constitute clear breaches
of the duty of confidentiality to the patient – for example285
the administrative processing of data with full identifiers
attached, and the re-identification during analysis of
data that has been previously anonymised.
These have been separated on an empirical basis into
7 distinct problem areas for healthcare institutions (be-290
low), and in the following section appropriate strategies
for prevention and management of each of these are
proposed.
• Accidental data losses and disclosures Many
personal information disclosures take place be-295
cause computers or memory devices carrying unen-
crypted personal health information are lost[eg 18],
stolen, sold or discarded. In some instances data is
lost in transit; in other instances data is incorrectly
sent to the wrong destination[eg19]. Data may also300
be embedded in hardware that is sent externally
for disposal or repair, so disclosing the data unnec-
essarily[eg 20]. These losses are easily prevented
with simple measures.
• Abuse of access privileges System users are as-305
signed access rights, but these privileges may en-
able the user to access records which they are
aware they should not: there is a cohort of individu-
als who will browse the system looking for familiar
names, and then accessing confidential data about310
them for which they have no access rights nor rea-
sons, thereby knowingly abusing their privileges.
These is an entire industry based on the lucrative
business of persuading such users to look up de-
tails to order (eg for employers, insurers, finance315
houses, attorneys etc) usually with the promise of
a reward for information provided - a sad reflection
on the business ethics of those receiving this infor-
mation. Where data is outsourced for processing,
responsibility lies with the outsourcing institution,320
but the data may be abused by the contractors and,
unless their abuse is a crime within the jurisdic-
tion where the outsourced processing takes place,
it may prove difficult if not impossible to prosecute
offenders even if they can be identified.325
• Improper data disclosures Sensitive personal in-
formation may be disclosed by staff of health-
related businesses, in some cases because they are
not aware of the limits on data disclosures and to
whom data may legitimately be disclosed, in other330
cases because they are deceived into disclosing ma-
terial that they should not – eg by someone posing
as a close relative.
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• Abuse of privacy by information technology
staff and contractors The nature of their work re-335
quires that IT staff may have to access files where
all manner of confidential information is stored –
about patients, staff, user privileges etc. In addi-
tion technical staff may have the knowledge and
skills necessary to copy, edit, export or delete data,340
as well as to eliminate traces of their activities, or
leave a trail leading to another innocent user. A
means has to be implemented to prevent this: this
is probably the most difficult problem to resolve
satisfactorily.345
• Unauthorised access from outside There is as
always the issue of preventing external hackers
from gaining access to systems, but at the same
time ensuring that legitimate remote users (eg other
clinics, clinicians, patients) are able to access the350
data/functions for which they have access privi-
leges. Many individuals may be afforded exter-
nal access privileges, including staff of the enter-
prise working from home: there is a significant risk
where the access routines (usernames, passwords355
etc) are embedded in computers which may be
used by others, or can be stolen, so compromising
that secure access.
• Disclosure of patient identity during routine
data processing As outlined above, the identity of360
the patient should not appear routinely on screen
together with their clinical details when clerks are
carrying out their normal daily business and ad-
ministrative functions of the institution: it is hard
to ignore the name of the patient when it is right in365
front of them – more so if that person is local and
happens to be known to them.
• Re-identification of anonymised and
pseudonymised data It is necessary to ad-
dress the issue of researchers and analysts who370
have a range of technical/research database linking
and management tools at their disposal which can
be used to manipulate the data held for example
in major data warehouses in order to retrieve the
identity of the patients whose anonymised or375
pseudonymised records have been made available
to them for legitimate research and analytic
purposes.
3.2 Practical Preventive Measures
Most of the above can be prevented using relatively380
simple technical and non-technical measures, along
with some minor re-arrangement of the ways in which
electronic health information management systems are
structured. Importantly education and awareness are
a central part of this, together with ensuring that all385
users are subject to a binding agreement regarding their
access rights and privileges. There are some generic
guidelines available - for example from the Office of
the UK Information Commissioner[21], as well as from
the International Standard ISO27001. Below are some390
specific measures that can be taken specifically in the
context of healthcare institutions.
• Preventing accidental data losses It seems in-
credible that large quantities of unencrypted per-
sonalised data are permitted to be moved onto395
portable devices, or exported as files to remote
locations. Encryption to render unreadable any
data that is to be exported in case it does go astray
should be mandatory, and downloads of encrypted
data should only be made by and through the400
IT desk to prevent the encryption step being by-
passed. Data should be encrypted asymmetrically:
this encrypted data would only be readable by the
holder of the private key corresponding to the pub-
lic key used to encrypt it. Where data is destined405
for a referring physician (eg about investigations,
patient discharge etc) all that should be sent is the
advice that the data is ready and where the data
has been placed: the legitimate recipient should
already have access rights to the patient folder and410
therefore can access it themselves, whilst an un-
intended recipient will be unable to read the data.
Such communications should in all cases be en-
crypted.
• Preventing abuse of access privileges All users415
must be aware of and contractually bound by their
rights of access and their ethical obligations – but
this may not be enough. It is relatively easy to as-
sociate a table of authorised users with each patient
encounter record. There may be additional tempo-420
rary users, such as the ward and clinic staff when a
patient is receiving inpatient care, and others that
may be identified/approved by patient. Patient ac-
cess authorisations will need a unique mark, with a
valid from and to period: this might be provided by425
a patient health card or other token, plus the PIN. In
the event that emergency access to patient records
is required and the patient cannot for whatever rea-
son provide this authorisation mark, a one-time
access arrangement can be made by a designated430
duty officer giving a valid reason for the access,
and thereby opening an audit trail which should
be reviewed and closed with the approval of the
patient after the event. All access by individuals
5
Neame | electronic Journal of Health Informatics 2012; Vol 7(2):e19
to personalised data should be logged and audit435
trailed, and these logs reviewed routinely looking
for evidence of inappropriate patterns of activity.
• Preventing Improper Data Disclosures Educa-
tion and training of staff regarding information
privacy is essential: procedures need to be in place440
identifying who may disclose patient-related data
and under what circumstances. Importantly aware-
ness alone is not sufficient: compliance needs to be
actively monitored to ensure improper disclosures
are not made.445
• Preventing abuses by IT staff This is probably
the most difficult privacy risk to manage effec-
tively, simply because of the privileges and skills
possessed by IT personnel due to the nature of the
work. One crucial issue is to ensure that ‘back door450
ports’ into the system that can be used remotely
by third parties (eg vendors, external technicians)
to access files, extract data and change software
without direct oversight by internal staff are closed,
or at least limited to functions that present no risks455
to privacy: all such ports should be monitored to
detect and terminate unusual activity. The system
should be designed such that personalised data in
medical records is held within an environment se-
cured by a top level access code: whenever this460
code is in use, there should be a supervisor mon-
itoring what is done, as well as a data log of the
event created that can be examined forensically if
needed.
• Preventing unauthorised external access This is465
a problem familiar to all IT service managers – how
to keep hackers at bay whilst at the same time not
impeding access for legitimate users. Authorised
external users must be provided with an access
routine that is robust and requires their identity to470
be authenticated (i.e. not just a username and PIN
that can be left in the memory of any machine, and
can readily be spoofed). Therefore as well as a
robust system-wide personal identification system,
every user should have a physical token (eg dongle,475
smart card, fingerprint etc) which can prove they
are the authorised user: the reason for such a physi-
cal token is that there is only one such in existence,
whereas a username can be used by many different
people. Communications between external users480
and the system should, of course, be encrypted to
prevent eavesdropping.
• Preventing disclosure of patient identity during
routine data processing There is no reason why
the readily human-recognisable identifiers such as485
name and address are used in routine data man-
agement: all systems assign the patient a system
identifier (eg unit record number) which is not read-
ily linked to a name by humans without access to a
lookup table: this can serve as well as any other for490
record identification for internal data management
needs. The issue is not one of ‘heavy’ security,
simply of filtering out unnecessary data: there is
no difficulty in doing a name lookup if this is re-
quired – of course all name lookups by staff should495
be monitored and audited to ensure there is a legit-
imate reason for the lookup and to detect unusual
patterns of such activity.
• Preventing re-identification of anonymised and
pseudonymised patient data Data from care en-500
counters is supplied to warehouses, analysts and
researchers: provision of personalised data would
invite privacy breaches, and therefore it should be
anonymised or pseudonymised as outlined above.
The use of a random cipher is strong as it makes re-505
identification difficult: however serial analysis of
the data using different parameters makes it mathe-
matically possible to re-identify records if the num-
ber of ‘hits’ from a specific query is sufficiently
small. Therefore a process should be implemented510
which terminates any analysis where the number of
‘hits’ is too small for privacy to be assured, requir-
ing the analyst to seek specific approval for that
enquiry – typically a minimal cell size of around
20 might be selected to support genuine analysis515
but reject attempts at record re-identification.
Pseudonymised data, whilst supporting vital lon-
gitudinal research, presents a greater privacy risk
simply because of the linking of several events over
time. Preventing the record for a single individ-520
ual being extracted is therefore vital, and this can
be achieved by removing the capacity to abstract
records based on pseudonym. The creative analyst
might then address the database directly to find all
records tagged with a specific pseudonym: this can525
also be frustrated by ensuring that the ID attached
to records in the database has been re-encrypted at
the access layer so that users are unaware of the
encrypted pseudonym assigned to an individual.
Even so the records may still contain references530
to family members and contacts in the body text,
posing some residual but relatively low level risk.
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4 Discussion
Many of the above ‘solutions’ require no further infras-
tructure: they could and should be implemented within535
any information management system. However there
are some specifics that merit some further discussion.
Patient Authorisations Information custodians may
hold records for patients, but access to personalised pa-
tient information should be only with the authorisation540
of the individual concerned (other than as outlined in
the exceptions above). For that to happen patients need
to have a means of making those authorisations with
a valid from and to date, in a way that can be authen-
ticated and audited. The simplest way of setting this545
up would be for patients to hold a token (eg health-
care card, insurance card etc) that is issued by a trusted
authority and which has been registered/validated for
the purposes of health data access authorisations – and
possibly also for other instances where verifiable con-550
sents may be required (eg consent to procedures etc).
The application itself could be added onto any existing
card if that is the clients preference, and then used to
generate an electronic authorisation (including period
of validity if required) for this specific purpose. The555
application might include the ability to establish a proxy
in favour of one or more individuals (eg physicians) to
act as their trusted agent(s) in deciding when and how
to share/disclose their data to third parties.
As an adjunct to this, each patient record will have a560
table of those with read access: only those individuals
who are identified on the access table will have the
right of access. Some individuals may be included on
a temporary basis – for example ward staff whilst the
patient is an inpatient; other may have automatic access565
rights – for example those undertaking clinical audits or
preparing reports where there is a legal requirement to
identify the individual concerned.
Strong Identification It goes almost without saying
that users of such an information system need to have a570
robust means of identifying themselves for connection
and use of services, and the system being able to authen-
ticate that they are who they say they are. User login
IDs and passwords are probably insufficient, since they
can easily be mis-used: users in hospitals have even575
been known to leave user ID and password combina-
tions stuck to the ward monitor, and routinely use each
others logins. For security to work, it is fundamental
the system can authenticate each and every user, both
locally and remotely. The use of a unique token of some580
sort seems the only way to achieve this: a device/token
that identifies the individual and requires a password to
activate it should be the logical choice for this, issued
by a regional or national authority. Such a proposal
has been put forward by the author elsewhere[22]. The585
same token can also be used to prepare the users ‘nor-
mal’ desktop on whatever networked workstation they
are currently using, to set up their logins to all the ser-
vices they require (‘single sign-on’), and manage their
encryption services (see below).590
Data Encryption There will be instances where data
is passed to a third party electronically on a memory
device or as a file transfer. In any such case the data
should be strongly encrypted using the public key of
the individual receiving the data: the data can then only595
be read by that individual using their private key. This
requires that a public key security infrastructure [16] is
implemented across the healthcare service. With data
encrypted in this way, losses of devices/media do not
pose any significant threat to privacy. This might link in600
with the previous two sections in the form of a health
system token (eg smart card) which can be used to iden-
tify robustly and authenticate providers, patients and
others in the health sector, to manage patient authorisa-
tions and consents and to manage encryption keys. The605
function of such a device could be extended so that it
could keep track of where records for an individual are
stored, using a healthcare encounters index with internet
‘pointers’ to where those records are located – includ-
ing in a patient-controlled internet-based repository if610
patients so choose, and as proposed elsewhere[23].
Sharing Data Where proprietary or legacy systems
do not readily permit external user access to the req-
uisite functions, data for sharing (eg records of care,
test and investigation results etc) can be posted on web615
servers, and/or uploaded to a patient online data reposi-
tory. If such data is posted to a web server, it would be
encrypted with the public key of the patient: the patient
can then use their ID token and private key to access and
copy the data as they wish. Those holding a copy of the620
patient key (ie authorised by the patient to access their
records), would also be able to access and download
records for the duration of the validity of their key.
Records in data warehouses As outlined above,
records in large collections present a real threat to pri-625
vacy. One approach to this, used in a national health
information infrastructure where the author was the de-
signer, is to replace identifiers with an alternate ID: the
alternate ID selected was the national healthcare user in-
dex number, to ensure that the ID was unique. Records630
were passed to the national database with this ID at-
tached, but at the access layer to the database the ID
was encrypted, so that no-one was aware of the ID at-
tached to the record in the database. Even if researchers
were able to get access to the database itself (which635
would be extremely difficult), searching the database to
extract records tagged with a specific patient ID would
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produced no ‘hits’ since all IDs in the database were
encrypted. However using the routine analysis tools to
access the database permitted all types of analysis of the640
data, including cross-sectional and longitudinal studies,
even though the identities associated with the records
were concealed.
5 Conclusion and Summary
Private health information that ought to be kept confi-645
dential is often not, even though simple measures could
be implemented to secure it better. Seven generic situa-
tions where personal information may be disclosed in
breach of the ethical principle of personal autonomy and
of personal information privacy. Few health informa-650
tion systems are designed with a view to implementing
the current applicable legislation requiring both that
patients give authorisation for anyone wishing to view
their records, and that personal records are made di-
rectly accessible to patients. Widespread losses and655
disclosures of health information run into millions of
records annually although this figure could be greatly
reduced or even eliminated by taking simple security
measures such as encryption. There is a clear need
effectively to manage the multiple unique identifiers660
within the care system, as well as to introduce a system
for robust authentication of all involved in healthcare –
clinicians, patients, analysts, administrators etc, along
with an audit trail of the information which they access.
PKI suggests itself as the logical approach to the665
encryption of information, and a token of some sort (eg a
smart card) seems the most practical way of identifying
and authenticating individuals, as well as permitting the
patient to exert control over their own data.
The root cause of the current problem appears to be670
a failure to adopt an appropriate privacy and security
conscious mind set when designing and developing such
systems, and a failure to implement a monitoring sys-
tems to assure that information is being kept appropri-
ately confidential at all times. Once a software system675
has been developed and installed, it is often almost im-
possible to retro-engineer appropriate privacy measures
into it: they need to be planned and implemented into
every level within the design.
5.1 Limitations and Further Research680
There are numerous obstacles to research into these
sensitive issues. One is that few institutions wish to
have made public their shortcomings in the confidential
treatment of personal information: they would rather it
was kept quiet and behind closed doors: therefore data685
is hard to obtain. The duty of confidentiality creates a
layer of complexity (and potentially cost also) in the
handling of patient data that clinicians, administrators
and technologists alike would prefer to leave aside in
order to get their work done effectively and efficiently.690
Despite the existence of legislation to protect personal
privacy, few patients are aware of their rights, and even
fewer feel in a position to exert their rights when they
are at their most vulnerable in the care of the doctor.
And whilst paying lip service to the privacy issue, few695
clinics or institutions make any concerted effort to audit
that the law or their internal policies on this topic are
complied with – unless there is a publicised incident or
a complaint. This may change however when the cost
of law suits (brought under privacy, data protection or700
human rights legislation) makes prevention more of a
priority.
As electronic records systems become more preva-
lent, and are being more widely networked and accessed
remotely, it is becoming increasingly vital that there705
should be performance criteria (minimum standards)
set down relating to the systems-related functions of
protecting personal information privacy. Unless these
systems support privacy, there is no real prospect that
their users will be able to. Once the functionality is710
there, it is important that a process of independent mon-
itoring of data logs is implemented to identify where
there may be concerns: the monitors would act to ensur-
ing compliance with the law and in the ‘best interests’
of the patients.715
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